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The primary goal of this paper is to develop a structured object-
oriented security requirements analysis methodology for the 
elicitation and analysis of security requirements in embedded 
systems. There are several approaches to elicit, analyze and 
specify security requirements in embedded systems ranging from 
formal mathematical models for proof of certain security 
properties to informal methods that are easily understood. 
Applicability of formal security models is limited because they 
are complex and it is time consuming to develop. On the other 
hand, informal security requirements analysis methods are not 
integrated with conceptual models in requirements analysis, and 
although both external and internal threats have been dealt using 
use cases and misuse cases, they provide no process for analyzing 
both internal and external threats in a structured manner. This 
paper discusses a structured object-oriented security requirements 
analysis methodology for the elicitation and analysis of security 
requirements in embedded systems. It is capable of identifying 
hierarchically both external and internal threats posed by both 
external and internal actors of a system level by level. It is 
illustrated and validated by security requirements analysis for an 
advanced embedded power grid control system. 
Keywords 
Security requirements, use cases, misuse cases, structured object-
oriented analysis, security goal, and security requirements. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Non functional aspects of an embedded system such as security, 
safety and reliability should be considered and incorporated in the 
system along with the functional requirements throughout its 
development process. Among the nonfunctional requirements, 
security requirements are of great importance because security 
failure of an embedded system may incur important political, 
financial and military loses. However security needs of an 
embedded system are often considered only after the 
implementation begins. We need to analyze security needs early 
in the process and integrate counter-measures to security threats 
into the system. There is also a need for a method which can 
identify security requirements at multiple levels of a system to 
deal with both external and internal threats rather than specifying 
the security requirements for the system as a whole. The existing 
methods for security requirements analysis do not address the 
issue of analyzing both internal and external threats in a structured 
manner. They only deal with the external mis-users of the system. 
A systematic process for a structured object-oriented 
security requirements analysis and specification is needed because 
objects represent the assets of a system. A Structured object-
oriented methodology can be used to model security requirements. 
This paper i) studies a few noticeable research on extending use 
cases to elicit and analyze security requirements and ii) introduces 
a new methodology where security requirements elicitation and 
analysis is done in a structured manner using HOOMT[7,8] and 
misuse cases. 
2. RELATED WORK 
Security requirements are usually specified to prevent any 
activities that may pose a threat to either the stakeholders or the 
system itself. Researchers believe that activities that pose a threat 
to the system can be effectively described using use cases by 
extending it to represent misuses and mis-users. These extended 
use cases are called misuse cases and are helpful in documenting 
negative scenarios which can be used to improve security by  
preventing them [3]. Sindre et al. developed a method to elicit 
security requirements using misuse cases [3]. In this method use 
cases and misuse cases are specified in a single diagram. In 
addition to the “include” and “extends” relations between use 
cases in UML, new relations called “prevents” and “detects” were 
introduced in this method. Ian Alexander developed a method for 
security requirements analysis using misuse cases in the context 
of trade-off analysis [4]. An ‘exception’ is considered to be an 
undesired event that could cause a system to fail and misuse case 
analysis is the best way to find possible ‘exceptions’. To analyze a 
trade-off in this method between the use cases and misuse cases 
two relationships; “threatens” and “mitigates” were introduced. 
Two more relations “aggravates” and “conflicts with” are also 
introduced. John McDermott and Chris Fox proposed an abuse 
case model to capture and analyze security requirements. They 
define abuse case as ‘a specification of a type of complete 
interaction between a system and one or more actors, where the 
results of the interaction are harmful to the system, one of the 
actors, or one of the stake holders in the system’ [5]. The authors 
also pointed out that because it is not sure where flaws will occur, 
an abuse case describes a family of undesirable interactions [6]. 
The above misuse case based approaches have provided a solid 
guideline for security requirements analysis. However, several 
important issues remain to be resolved, such as the integration of 
analysis of misuse cases and negative scenarios with conceptual 
models which describes assets of a system, such as object models; 
and the analysis of both external and internal threats in a 
structured process.  
3. OUR APPROACH 
The primary objective of this research is to develop a systematic 
framework for structured object-oriented security requirements 
analysis to elicit and analyze security requirements in an 
embedded system. The proposed framework is expected to 
improve the existing methods introduced in the previous section 
by developing a structured object-oriented security requirements 
analysis process to identify both internal and external threats level 
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by level.  The system structure is modeled by a high-order object 
model based on a High-order Object-oriented Modeling 
Technique (HOOMT) [7, 8]. The HOOMT provides a structured 
object-oriented design methodology which is based on 
hierarchical model development. The term ‘decompose’ in this 
research represents a process that reveals the sub-components at a 
lower level of an object, use case, misuse case, security use case 
or a security requirement.  
Figure 1 illustrates a structured object-oriented security 
requirements process. In the first step a context object diagram is 
developed which shows the interactions between the high-order 
system object and the external objects. In the second step, at each 
level of decomposition, use cases are specified to identify the 
main functionalities of an object. In the third step, misuse cases 
and mis-users which can cause harm to the functionalities that 
have been represented by use cases are identified. At all levels, 
mis-users can be either external actors or internal actors. There are 
various relations through which use cases and misuse cases can be 
related. In this paper we elicit and analyze the security 
requirements of a FACTS Power System. In order to present an 
example and describe the elicitation and analysis process, we are 
considering three actions namely ‘disable’, ‘distort’, and 
‘disclose’. The use cases and misuse cases are related using these 
three actions i.e. ‘disable’, ‘distort’, and ‘disclose’ respectively. 
The ‘disable’ relates a use case and a misuse case where the 
misuse case completely disables a functionality represented by a 
use case. The ‘distort’ relates a use case to a misuse case where 
the misuse case distorts the functionality represented by the use 
case. Finally, the ‘disclose’ relates a use case and a misuse case 
where the misuse case discloses important information about the 
entities that get benefited by a functionality of the system 
represented by a use case. In the fourth step security use cases are 
derived which act as countermeasures to the misuse cases. These 
security use cases are related to the misuses cases using ‘prevents’ 
and ‘mitigates’ relations. The ‘prevents’ relates a security use case 
and a misuse case where a security use case completely stops a 
negative scenario represented by a misuse case from happening.   
The ‘mitigates’ relates a security use case and a misuse case 
where a security use cases reduces the threat of a misuse case. 
Finally at step five security requirements are derived from 
security use cases. The security use cases and security 
requirements are related using a relation called ‘satisfy’. The 
‘satisfy’ relates a security use case and a security requirement 
where the security use case satisfies the derived security 
requirement. At each subsequent level of decomposition all the 
above five steps are repeated until a stage is reached where all the 
objects are primitive and further decomposition is impossible or 
unnecessary. At the end of this structured object oriented security 
requirements process, we obtain a set of security requirements 
which are capable of securing the target system at each level of 
abstraction.  
A detailed process for the hierarchical development and 
analysis of misuse cases based on high-order objects models and 
use case diagrams is shown in Figure 2. At the top level a context 
object diagram is developed which shows the interactions between 
the high order system object and its external objects. Starting from 
the top level, security use case diagrams are developed 
corresponding to the misuse case diagrams. These security use 
cases are related to the misuse cases using ‘mitigates’ and 
‘prevents’ relations. At each hierarchical level security 
requirements are derived from security use cases. 
The decomposition process continues until a stage is 
reached where the objects are primitive and corresponding use 
cases and misuse cases are fully explored, Figure 3 represents a 
detailed process for the hierarchical development and analysis of 
security requirements based on misuse case diagrams and security 
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Figure 2: A detailed process for the hierarchical development and analysis of misuse cases
security requirements using the ‘satisfies’ relation. The 
decomposition process is continued until a stage is reached 
where each misuse case at all levels is prevented or mitigated 
using security use cases and finally corresponding security 
requirements are derived. As an addition to the proposed 
systematic framework, a ‘misuse sequence diagram’ is 
introduced that will help to better explain a misuse case 
scenario.  Figure 4 represents a misuse sequence diagram, which 
shows the sequence of message passing that takes place in a 
misuse case scenario. It describes a misuse case initiated by a 
mis-user where the mis-user blocks some of the data sent by one 
of the objects. Object 1 sends data to Object 2 which in turn 
sends it to Object 3. The Object 3 sends back the 
acknowledgement to Object 1 through Object 2.  The mis-user 
object, represented by a shaded rectangle, blocks some of the 
data from reaching the destination. Misuse sequence diagrams 
can be helpful in deriving security requirements because they 
help to better explain misuse cases.  
4. APPLICATION EXAMPLES 
This section is used to describe the application examples on 
which the proposed systematic framework is implemented. It is 
based on development of a simulated FACTS power system, 
where a number of FACTS devices are incorporated into a 
power grid network to act as a distributed, fault-tolerant, and 
real-time constrained embedded control system.  
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Figure 3: A detailed process for the hierarchical development and analysis of security requirements  
 
 
Control of power networks is a tedious task because of its sheer 
size. They are vulnerable to contingencies like line failure. A 
combination of such contingencies may lead to a cascading power 
failure. The family of “Flexible Alternating Current Transmission 
System” (FACTS) devices shows promise for use as network-
embedded controllers [1, 2]. There is an ongoing research to 
incorporate a number of FACTS devices into a power grid 
network to act as a distributed, fault-tolerant, and real-time 
constrained control system. The ‘Structured Object-Oriented 
Security Requirements Process’ is implemented on the FACTS 
power system to identify the misuse cases and mis-users that can 
cause harm to the power system and finally derive security 
requirements. The high-order object model for the target system 
was previously developed as part of a research on object-oriented 
co-analysis/co-design of the FACTS power system [8]. Figure 5 
shows the context object diagram for the FACTS power system. 
The context object diagram shows the interactions between the 
high-order system object which in this target system is the 
‘FACTS Power System.’ and external objects ‘Contingency’ and 
‘Service Provider’. The context object diagram is then further 
decomposed into a set of components and their relationships in the 
following high-order object diagrams. The ‘FACTS Power 
System’ system object is decomposed into its high-order objects 
such as ‘Facts device’, ‘Placement’ and ‘Power transmission 
system’ in Figure 6. Figure 7 represents the ‘Use case-Misuse 
case’ diagram of the corresponding level of hierarchy respectively. 
Once the use cases for each object namely ‘FACTS device’, 
‘Placement’ and ‘Power transmission system’ are developed, we 
obtain the security requirements also. 
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Figure 5: Context object diagram for Facts Power System 
At the ‘FACTS Power System’ object level four significant 
misuse cases are identified such as ‘Physical destruction of 
FACTS device’, Physical destruction of power lines’, ‘Change 
FACTS device settings’ and ‘Interpretation of exchanged 
messages’. These misuse cases are initiated by the misusers 
‘Contingency’ and ‘Intentional’. Based on the identified misuse 
cases, counter-measures are derived which are represented as 
security use cases in Figure 7. Finally security requirements are 
developed from the security use cases. Figure 8 shows the top 
level security requirements for the target system.  
 
 
Figure 6: Decomposition of ‘Facts Power System’ object 
 
 
Figure 7: Use case-Misuse case diagram for ‘Facts Power 
System’ object 
 
Figure 8: Security requirements for ‘Facts Power System’ 
object  
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At the second level ‘UPFC Facts device’ object is decomposed 
into following four sub objects, ‘DSP board’, ‘Embedded 
computer’, ‘Interface board’ and ‘UPFC Power electronics’. 
Figure 9 represents the high-order object model for ‘UPFC Facts 




Figure 9: Decomposition of ‘UPFC Facts Device’ object 
 
The ‘UPFC Facts Device’ object has use cases, such as 
‘Control_power_line’, Change_set_point’,‘Read _sensor_data’ 
and ‘Record_settings’. The misusers ‘Contingency’ and 
‘Intentional’ initiates three misuse cases such as ‘change set point 
of long term control’, ‘Change control point in dynamic control’, 
‘Change sensor data in DSP board’ and ‘Modify Updated 
Settings’. Counter-measures which are represented as security use 
cases in Figure 10, are derived from the use cases.  
 
Figure 10: Use case – Misuse case diagram for ‘UPFC Facts 
Device’ object 
Finally security requirements are developed from the security use 
cases. Figure 11 shows the security requirements for the ‘Facts 
UPFC Device’ object level. At the third level ‘Embedded 
computer’ object is decomposed into ‘Dynamic control’ and 
‘Long term control’ sub objects.  
 
 
Figure 11: Security requirements for ‘UPFC Facts Device’ 
object 
Figure 12 represents the high-order object model for the 
‘Embedded computer’ object. The long term control takes sensor 
data from a power grid, and when necessary it computes new 
power flows and generations, and then it loads them to 
compensate for contingencies (such as line outages) in the power 
grid. The function of the dynamic control is to respond in the 
short term to fluctuations in the power line attached to the FACTS 
device, in addition to providing a smooth transition from the 
current power settings to new set points generated by the long 
term control.  The decomposition also shows the connection of the 
long term control to the simulation engine, a connection that 
represents the sending of simulated sensor data to the long term 
control. The decomposition also shows any changes in generation 
settings sent from the long term control back to the simulation 




Figure 12: Decomposition of ‘Embedded computer’ object 
One of the major use cases in ‘Embedded computer’ object is 
‘compute_next_level_setpoint’. The mis-users ‘Contingency’ and 
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‘Intentional’ initiates three misuse cases such as ‘Randomly lose 
flow messages’, ‘Alter all flow messages’, Randomly invert 
accept/reject messages’, and ‘Increase edge flow’. Based on the 
identified misuse cases, counter-measures are derived which are 
represented as security use cases in Figure 13. Finally, security 
requirements are developed from the security use cases. Figure 14 
shows the security requirements for the ‘Embedded computer’ 
object level.  
 




Figure 14: Security requirements for ‘Embedded computer’ 
object 
The Figure 15 represents the misuse sequence diagram for the 
‘Randomly Lose Flow Messages’ misuse case.  
 
 
Figure 15: Misuse Sequence Diagram for ‘Randomly Lose 
Flow Messages’ Misuse Case  
5. CONCLUSION 
Security requirements are of great importance these days as many 
embedded systems are under threat. Although existing methods 
have provided a useful guideline for security requirements 
analysis, several important issues remain to be addressed 
including integration of security requirements analysis methods 
with conceptual models such as object models of system assets, 
and analysis of both internal and external threats in a structured 
manner. This paper successfully addresses these issues by 
proposing a structured object-oriented security requirements 
process in which security requirements for the entire system is 
derived level by level in a structured manner. This methodology is 
capable of analyzing security requirements by identifying threats 
posed by both external and internal actors of a system. Object-
oriented nature of this methodology helps in identifying the assets 
of a system which are basically the system objects. To test the 
applicability, the proposed methodology is successfully 
demonstrated and applied to a real time FACTS power system. As 
a result misuse cases at three different levels of hierarchy could be 
identified. Counter-measures for these misuse cases are identified 
as security use cases. Finally security requirements are derived 
based on the security use cases.  Security requirements derived at 
each level of hierarchy when grouped together represents the 
security requirements specification for the entire system. 
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